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Introduction
The withdrawal of Hong Kong from the British Commonwealth and its resulting
status as an administrative region of The People's Republic of China has changed
several aspects of fundamental law in Hong Kong. One such aspect is the effect on
the law of real property.' Courts in Hong Kong have begun to cite US case law for
various propositions of law, and particularly in the area of compensation for land
use regulations that affect otherwise permitted uses of land. In the United States,
regulations that go 'too far' may be considered takings, for which compensation
from the government regulator may be due. In other words, under certain
circumstances, the effect of a regulation is deemed similar to an exercise of the
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power to compulsory purchase land, which in the US is regarded as an exercise of
the power of eminent domain.2
In particular, the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
has cited US authority and made arguments using language suggesting the use of
US precedent in regulatory takings in its recent decision in Fine Tower Associates,
LTD v Town Planning Board, decided in April of 2005. There, the occupant of
land under the typical Hong Kong long term ground lease challenged the application
of an Outline Zoning Plan (hereafter OZP) to the subject property on the ground
that the limitations thus imposed on use amounted to a deprivation of the applicant's
rights in land, demanding either an amendment to the draft OZP or a
recommendation that the land be 'resumed' (the rough equivalent of a compulsory
taking) and compensation paid, as required by Articles 105 and 6 of the Basic Law
governing Hong Kong.' The Department of Justice took the position that the
argument that the draft OZP was tantamount to compulsory acquisition of land
was untenable.
In holding that the draft OZP did not 'take' property rights protected by the
Basic Law, the Court first quoted extensively from an earlier case which cited US
regulatory takings cases upholding land use regulations against takings challenges:
Grape Bay Limited v Attorney General ofBermuda. There, the Privy Council held
it was 'well settled' that restrictions on the use of property imposed in the public
interest by general regulatory laws do not constitute a deprivation of property for
which compensation should be paid, citing the unsuccessful facial challenges to
zoning regulations in Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co,6 and Penn Central
Transportation Co v New York City.7 However, the Court also cited the more recent
Hong Kong case of Kowloon Poultry Loan Merchants Association v Director of
Agricultural Fisheries and Conservation,' in which the court stated that deprivation
of property is not limited to cases where property is formally expropriated, but
may also exist where a regulation so affects the 'substance' of the property that
there has been a de facto expropriation. Citing the seminal US case on regulatory
takings, Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon,9 the Court then noted that if a measure
restricting the use and enjoyment of property goes too far, that will be recognized
2 See, eg, Steven J Eagle, Regulatory Takings (Lexis, 2d ed 2001); Robert Meltz, Dwight H
Merriam & Richard M Frank, The Takings Issue: Constitutional Limits on Land Use Control
and Environmental Regulation (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999); Fred Bosselman,
David L Callies & John Banta, The Taking Issue (Washington: US Government Printing
Office, 1973).
3 [2005] HKCU 504, (CFI) (Unreported).
4 Ibid, paras 22-23.
5 [1999] 1 WLR 574 (PC).
6 272 US 365 (1926).
7 438 US 104 (1978).
8 [2002] 4 HKC 277, (CA).
9 260 US 393 (1922).
78
TAKINGS: PHYSICAL AND REGULATORY
as a taking, requiring compensation. Holding that such a conclusion was for the
Town Planning Board to reach, and that there was a viable argument that the draft
OZP could constitute such a deprivation by regulation, the Court remanded to
the Board to hear full argument. The Board reconsidered the matter and concluded
that its decision would not amount to a deprivation of property, a decision which
was upheld by the Court of First Instance.10
While the above briefest of summaries of some of the relevant cases may not be
sufficient to fully set out the present state of physical and regulatory takings law in
Hong Kong, it is perhaps enough to demonstrate increasing citation of, if not
reliance upon, US takings jurisprudence in this field. It therefore becomes more
than simply a useful exercise to sketch the basics of that law in the United States
together with selected examples of what inferior (lower) federal and state courts in
the United States have done with that jurisprudence. What follows is a summary
of the pertinent US cases, in the context of the current state of physical and regular
takings jurisprudence in the United States, together with selected examples from
'lower' courts." We commence with the US law on physical takings or compulsory
purchase, to which the law of taking by regulation directly relates.
I. Physical Takings: Eminent
Domain in the United States
Generally, any unit of government in the United States-federal, state or local-
can use its sovereign powers to take private land for public use. The same is true
for quasi-governmental agencies and public corporations and utilities. The limits
placed on the exercise of that power are defined in the statutes that created
them.12 The technical term most often used, 'eminent domain,' does not imply
that a government's right to take such real estate interests is based on a preeminent
sovereign tide or prerogative.13 Rather, most authorities agree it is based on the
concept that the power is necessary to fulfill a sovereign governmental function, in
the interests of all the people which that government, as a general purpose
10 Fine TowerAssociates, LTD v Town Planning Board [2006] 4 HKLRD 34 (CFI).
" See, for further analysis and background, Steven J Eagle, Regulatory Takings (Lexis, 2d ed
2001); Robert Meltz, Dwight H Merriam & Richard M Frank, The Takings Issue:
ConstitutionalLimits on Land Use Control and Environmental Regulation (Washington, DC:
Island Press, 1999); Fred Bosselman, David L Callies & John Banta, The Taking Issue
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973).
12 Dankert, 'Planning for Condemnation-the Condemnor's Problems', in Institute on
Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, (Matthew Bender, 1989) at s 11. 03. See Albert
Hanson Lumber Co v US, 261 US 581, 587 (1923) and US v Carmack, 329 US 230, 241-
242 (1946).
13 See Gavin M Erasmus, Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, 1-2 (ALI-ABA Course of Study,
7 January 1993).
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government, represents." The power is thus based not on ultimate ownership by
the state, but on the exercise of its sovereign powers, vested in the legislature but
exercised by the executive branch of government.'I
However, to say that eminent domain is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty
clashes with the concept of individual rights, particularly those to private property:
if government may take property for a public use, then the individual has no
guarantee that private property is safe from confiscation. Indeed, there is no such
guarantee under the British system of government. The American solution to the
dilemma was to adopt such a guarantee of private property rights in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that government
shall not take private property except for a public use and upon payment of just
compensation. 6 Thus, the US Constitution limits the exercise of eminent domain
by the federal government (public use and compensation) which is presumed to
have such power (though never expressly granted) which limitation is extended to
the states by the Federal Constitution's 14th Amendment.
The power to initiate the exercise of eminent domain ordinarily resides
exclusively in the legislature. In some cases the legislature itself, by mere enactment
of a statute or resolution, affects the taking of certain land or interest in land for
public use. In cases where a constitutional provision is self executing and declares
that land can be condemned for certain specified uses, proceedings to take land for
such purposes may be instituted without waiting for authority from the legislature.
For example, municipal corporations have no prerogative right to exercise the power
of eminent domain and cannot take land for public uses unless the power has been
conferred on them by the legislature. However, there have been cases where a state
constitution authorizes cities to write their own charters. In such instances, a city
may give itself the power of eminent domain and provide that it may exercise the
power beyond its own limits, without the aid of any legislative act.17
Both private and public corporations have the right to take property if that
right is delegated to them by the state. Legislatures can create different classes of
corporations that are authorized to use eminent domain." Government imposes
different burdens in the exercise of eminent domain under the same conditions for
municipal corporations and private corporations because there is sufficient difference
between them."
A. The Public Use Requirement
While the definition of public use has not changed significantly in the past twenty
years, public perception of that change has. The federal rule, anticipated in Berman
14 West River Bridge Co v Dix, 47 US 507 (1848).
15 29A CJS Eminent Domain § 2 (2007).
16 US Const The Fifth Amendment.
17 lA Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.03[1].
18 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.04[2].
9 Ibid; Steinhart v Mendocino County Ct, 70 P 629 (Cal 1902).
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v Parker0 , was established in Hawaii Housing Authority ('HHA) v Midkiff2 1 so
long as a public use (redefined as public purpose) is conceivable and possible, even
if it never comes to pass, federal courts will accept it. The US Supreme Court
simply reiterated that rule in the 2005 case of Kelo v New London,2 2 holding that
economic revitalization was a sufficient public purpose to justify the taking of a
non-blighted single family home under local eminent domain statutes. A number
of state courts had established a more stringent test than the supreme court of
Connecticut, (which the Court affirmed in Kelo), which, of course, the states may
do since further protecting property rights beyond the minimum under federal
law is a matter for the states, as indeed the Supreme Court noted in Kelo.
Nevertheless, the decision set off a firestorm of criticism, leading to pending
legislation in two-thirds of the states to establish a more strict public purpose test
to avoid results such as that in Kelo.
In Kelo v City ofNew London,23 a bare majority of the Court upheld the exercise
of eminent domain for the purpose of economic revitalization. Heavily relying on
its previous decisions in Berman v Parker,24 and HHA v Midkiff25 the Court stated
that it was too late to revisit its present expansive view of public use, formally
stating that there is no difference in modern eminent domain practice between
public use and public26 purpose-at least in federal court. Indeed, by a narrow
5/4 vote, the Court specifically equated public use and public purpose before
holding that condemning land for economic revitalization was at worst simply
another small step along the continuum of permitting public benefits to be sufficient
indicia of meeting public use/public purpose requirements for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.27 As the Court also noted, it is now up to the
states to decide whether or not to increase the burden on government exercise of
compulsory purchase powers.28
20 348 US 26 (1954).
21 467 US 229 (1984).
22 545 US 469 (2005).
23 545 US 469 (2005).
24 348 US 26 (1954).
25 467 US 229 (1984).
26 Kelo, 545 US 469 at 484.
27 Ibid, at 484-86.
28 Of the slightly more than a dozen state courts that have considered whether economic
revitalization is sufficient public use for governmental exercise of eminent domain, about
half have decided-like Connecticut-that it is. Now the US Supreme Court has decided
that it is.About half-like Michigan in its recent and thoroughly reviewed and discussed
County of Wayne v Hathcock, 684 NW2d 765 (Mich 2004)-have decided that it is not,
utilizing various tests such as whether the condemnation serves primarily a public purpose
or primarily benefits the private sector. See, for extensive analysis and commentary, Amanda
Eckhoff and Dwight A Merriam, 'Public Use Goes Peripatetic: First, Michigan Reverses
Poletown and Now the Supreme Court Grants Review in an Eminent Domain Case' (Jan
2005) 56 Plan &EnvtlL No 1; Steven J Eagle, 'The Public Use Requirement and Doctrinal
Renewal' (2004) 34 EnvtlL Rep 10999.
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1. The State of the Federal Law on Public Use Before Kelo: Berman v
Parker and HHA v Midkiff
In Berman the Court dealt with the condemnation of a thriving department store
contained in a large parcel condemned by a redevelopment agency for the statutory
(Congressional in this instance) purpose of eliminating blight, all in accordance
with a required redevelopment plan.29 Justice Douglas for the majority commenced
by observing famously that a community could decide to be attractive as well as
safe, and that in thus justifying eminent domain to accomplish these goals, 'We
deal, in other words ... with the police power. '"0 This led to a controversial joining
of the two powers which has affected definitions of public use ever since by obviating
any need for the public to actually use the property condemned so long as it
furthered a public purpose. Indeed, the landowners pointed out that their land
would simply be turned over to another private owner." No matter, said Douglas:
'But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress along to
determine, once the public purpose has been established. The public end may be
as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a
department of government-or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say
that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of
community redevelopment projects'.32
To the landowners' argument that their particular parcel was unblighted and
that therefore its condemnation violated the Fifth Amendment's public use clause,
Justice Douglas responded that if experts concluded the area must be planned as a
whole in order to prevent reversion to a slum, so be it." Despite this broad language,
many conceived the decision to apply largely to redevelopment projects, and in
particular those which were well-planned in accordance with clear statutory
mandates. Not so after HA-L4 v Midkiff
In 1967 the Hawaii State Legislature passed a land reform act the principal
purpose of which was to eliminate a perceived oligopoly in available residential
land which was thought to adversely affect the price and availability of housing for
its citizens.34 Eminent domain was the means chosen to solve the problem. The act
authorized a state agency-the Hawaii Housing Authority-to condemn the fee
simple interest in land which was leased to individual homeowners, for the purpose
of conveying that interest to some other private owner, usually the existing owner's
lessee who owned the house on the land." The main target of the legislation was
the Bishop Estate (as it was then known), a charitable trust created by Princess
29 Berman, 348 US 26 at 31.
30 Ibid, at 32.
31 Ibid, at 3 1.
32 Ibid, at 33-34.
3 Ibid, at 34-35 (citations omitted).
34 Midkiff 467 US 229 at 232-33.
3 Ibid, at 233.
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Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a descendent of King Kamehameha the Great and whose
large landholdings she eventually inherited. The Estate challenged the act's
condemnation process as a taking without the public use required by the US
Constitution's Fifth Amendment. 6 While the Federal District Court upheld the
statute, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute essentially provided
for a 'naked' transfer from one private individual to another, and so lacked the
requisite public use.3 1
In a unanimous decision, the US Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.
Citing Berman, the court explained that courts should not interfere once a legislative
body has declared a public purpose, unless that purpose was 'palpably without
reasonable foundation' or involved an 'impossibility.' The means were irrelevant;
this was simply a mechanism or process to accomplish the legislatively-declared
public purpose. Indeed, it would make no difference, said Justice O'Connor writing
for the Court, if that public purpose never came to pass, so long as the legislature
could reasonably have thought it would when enacting the statute." Note
throughout the frequent use of public purpose, instead of public use. These words
would come back to haunt Justice O'Connor in Kelo.
2. Kelo v City of New London: Midkff and Berman Followed
The Court in Kelo simply extended the reasoning in Berman and Midkiffto the
economic revitalization condemnations that are increasingly common throughout
urban areas in the United States. Indeed, the majority was singularly unimpressed
with extreme uses of eminent domain for the purposes of providing employment
and bettering the local tax base which the parties brought to its attention: 'A parade
of horribles is especially unpersuasive in this context since the Takings Clause
largely operates as a conditional limitation permitting the government to do what
it wants so long as it pays the charge.'40
The facts in Kelo are straightforward. In order to take advantage of a substantial
private investment in new facilities by Pfizer, Inc, in an economically depressed
area of New London, Connecticut, the City reactivated the private non-profit
New London Development Corporation (NLDC) to assist in planning the area's
economic development. Authorized and aided by grants totaling millions of dollars,
NLDC held meetings and eventually 'finalized an integrated development plan
focused on 90 acres.' The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of most of
the real estate in the 90-acre area, but its negotiations with the owners of 15
36 Ibid, at 234-35.
1 Ibid, at 235.
38 Ibid, at 240-42.
39Ibid, at 241.
4 Kelo, 445 US 469, at 487, n19 (citing Eastern Enterprises vApfel, 524 US 498, 545 (1998)).
For a compendious list of such 'horribles,' see Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain
(2003), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/publications/report/index.html.
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properties failed. When the NLDC initiated condemnation proceedings the
landowners sued. Among them was Susette Kelo, who had lived in the Fort Trumbull
redevelopment area since 1997. Kelo had made extensive improvements to her
house, which she prized for its water view. Another petitioner, Wilhelmina Dery,
was born in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and lived there her entire life. Although
there was no allegation that any of these properties were blighted or otherwise in
poor condition, they were nevertheless condemned with the others 'because they
happen to be located in the development area.'41 On these facts, petitioners claimed
that the taking of their property violated the public use clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of
some properties but not others, and both sides appealed to the Supreme Court of
Connecticut. That court held that all of the City's proposed takings were
constitutional. Noting that the proposed takings were authorized by the state's
municipal development statute and in particular the taking of even developed
land as part of an economic development project was for a public use and in the
public interest, the court relied on Berman and Midkiff in holding that such
economic development qualified as a public use under both federal and state
constitutions. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari 'to determine whether a
city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies
the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment.'4 2
The Court's answer: an unequivocal yes. While the Court noted that 'the
sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring to
another private party B... it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from
one private party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the
taking.'4 ' The issue, then, is what constitutes sufficient use by the public. Three
factors appear to be important in reaching the conclusion that economic
revitalization in New London constitutes such use: a rigorous planning process,
the Court's precedents embodied in Berman andMidkffi and deference to federalism
and state decision making.
The Court commenced its analysis by reiterating that private-private transfers
alone are unconstitutional and any pretextual public purposes meant solely to
accomplish such transfers would fail the public use test. However, the Court
observed that the governmental taking in Kelo was meant to 'revitalize the local
economy by creating temporary and permanent jobs, generating a significant
increase in tax revenue, encouraging spin-off activities and maximizing public access
to the waterfront'44 all in accordance with a 'carefully considered' 4 and 'carefully
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, at 477. A petition for a writ of certiorari is the method for seeking review of lower
court decisions by the US Supreme Court.
41 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
11 Ibid, at 478.
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formulated' 4 6 development plan in accordance with a state statute 'that specifically
authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development.4 7
Therefore, the 'record clearly demonstrates that the development plan was not
intended to serve the interests of Pfizer, Inc, or any other private entity.'4 8 Indeed,
the Court was particularly impressed by 'the comprehensive character of the plan
[and] the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption.' 9 Although little in
the plan demonstrated any actual use by the public, the Court observed that it had
embraced a broader and more 'natural' interpretation of public use as public purpose
at least since the end of the 19th Century and 'we have repeatedly and consistently
rejected that narrow [use by the public] test ever since.'
Next, the Court observed that this broad definition of public use accorded
with its 'longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.'5 1
The Court then discussed its decisions in Berman and Midkiffas demonstrations
of such legislative deference, quoting heavily from the language in Berman about
'the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.'5 2 The Court concluded that its 'jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.'5 3
The Court steadfastly rejected any suggestion that it formulate a more rigorous
test. 5 Thus, for example, to require government to show that public benefits would
actually accrue with reasonable certainty or that the implementation of a
development plan would actually occur would take the Court into factual inquiries
already rejected in an earlier regulatory takings case. Similarly, the Court declined
to second-guess the city's determinations as to what lands it needed to acquire in
order to pursue the project. 6 Lastly, the Court rejected the invitation by some
amici (friend of the court briefs) to deal with the appropriateness of compensation
under the circumstances. While the Court acknowledged the hardships which the
condemnations might entail in this case, these questions are not before us in this
litigation' even though members of the Court itself raised the adequacy of
46 Ibid, at 483.
4 Ibid, at 484.
48 Ibid, at 478, n6.
49 Ibid, at 484.
50 Ibid, at 480.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. (quoting Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 33 (1954)).
53Ibid, at 483.
54Ibid, at 487.
5 Lingle v Chevron USA Inc, 544 US 528 (2005).
56 Kelo, 454 US 469, 488-89.
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compensation during oral argument.17 In a nod to federalism and states rights, the
Court closed by leaving to the states any remedy for such hardships posed by the
condemnations in New Canaan: 'We emphasize that nothing in our opinion
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power. Indeed, many states already impose "public use" requirements that are
stricter than the federal baseline.'5 8
Only Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests some small role yet for federal
courts in determining that a particular exercise of eminent domain might fall short
of the required public use requirement: 'There may be private transfers in which
the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a
presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public
Use Clause.'5 ' This is, however, largely a due process argument rather than a Fifth
Amendment argument, and in any event, continued Kennedy: 'This demanding
level of scrutiny is not required simply because the purpose of the taking is economic
development. '60
3. The Dissents: What's Wrong with Kelo (and Midkiffand Berman)?
The argument for a judicial hands-off is not so strong as the Court majority suggests,
however, as the vigorous dissents from Justices O'Connor and Thomas demonstrate.
Particularly strong is the dissent by Justice O'Connor who wrote the broadly-
worded Midkiff opinion for a unanimous Court in 1984. Observing that the
question of what is a public use is a judicial, not a legislative one,1 Justice O'Connor
commences by declaring that if economic development takings meet the public
use requirement, there is no longer any distinction between private and public use
of property, the effect of which is 'to delete the words "for public use" from the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' 62
But what then of Berman and her own language in Midkiff These decisions,
according to O'Connor, were exceptions to the Court's jurisprudence which
required public use to be actual use by the public. The Court, says O'Connor, has
5 Ibid, at 489, n 21 Other countries provide a measure of extra compensation where, as here, it
is a private residence which is condemned and the landowner has a demonstrable emotional
attachment to the improved land. See, eg, the Australian concept of solatium, amounting to
up to 10% additional compensation beyond fair market value in such circumstances, briefly
noted (among other compensation issues) in Lee Anne Fennell, 'The Death of Poletown: The
Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of Wayne v Hathcock:
Taking Eminent Domain Apart' (2004) 2004 Mich St L Rev 957, 1004 (referencing Murray
J Raff, 'Planning Law and Compulsory Acquisition in Australia', in Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David
L Callies (eds), Taking Land: Compulsory Purchase and Land Use Regulation in Asian-Paciic
Countries (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp 27, 44.
58 Kelo, 454 US 469, 489.
5 Ibid, at 493 (Kennedy, J, concurring) (emphasis in original).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, at 499 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) (citing Cincinnati v Vester, 281 US 439 (1930)).
62 Ibid, at 494.
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'identified' three categories of public use takings of private property:
1. transfers to public ownership for such as roads, hospitals and military bases;"
2. transfers to private common carriers or utilities for railroads or stadia (both of
which she characterizes as 'straightforward and uncontroversial')6 and;
3. the rare 'public purpose' case 'in certain circumstances and to meet certain
exigencies'65 such as the eradication of blight and slums in Berman and the
elimination of oligopoly in Midkiff where deference to legislative determinations
were warranted because the 'extraordinary precondemnation use of the targeted
property inflicted affirmative harm on society.'66
In other words, these were exceptional circumstances clearly not replicated in
New London, and the application of this third exceptional category in these
circumstances 'significantly expands the meaning of public use.'67 If, as the majority
suggests, government can take private property and give it to new private users so
long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary public benefit like
increased tax revenues or more jobs, then 'for public use' does not exclude any
takings.
Dismissing Justice Kennedy's test as one which no one but a 'stupid staffer'6 9
could fail, Justice O'Connor finds the logic of the Court's decision such that '[n]
othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.' 70 Leaving any tougher
standards designed to limit such possibilities to the states is 'an abdication of our
responsibility. States play many important functions in our system of dual
sovereignty, but compensating for our refusal to enforce properly the Federal
Constitution ... is not among them.' She ends with concerns for those with fewer
resources who will suffer in contests over exercises of eminent domain with those
with 'disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large
corporations and development firms'[.] 72
Justice Thomas raises similar concerns in his dissent, but in considerably more
detail. Picking up on Justice O'Connor's concern for the politically least powerful
6 Ibid, at 497.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, at 498.
6 Ibid, at 500.
67 Ibid, at 501.
68 Ibid, Justice O'Connor also confesses error (her own as well as the Court's) in ever equating
public use and the police power, from which, she accurately observes, much of the expanded
doctrine of public use into broad public purpose, and particularly deference to legislative
determinations of public purpose, derive.
69 Ibid, at 502.
70 Ibid, at 503.
71 Ibid, at 504.
72 Ibid, at 505.
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and characterizing the Court's deferential standard as 'deeply perverse,' Justice
Thomas provides several examples indicating that those uprooted in even the urban
renewal cases were overwhelmingly poor, elderly, black, or all of the above.73 His
disagreement with the Court, however, goes much deeper than that of Justice
O'Connor. Reviewing a series of court opinions and writings from the late 18th
Century, Justice Thomas concludes that the cases cited by the majority for the
proposition that public use meant public purpose rather than use by the public in
the early years of the republic were exceptions-aberrations that varied from the
usual rule. Thomas concludes that the Court's current public use jurisprudence
therefore rejects the original meaning of the public use clause, to which he urges
the Court to return, and from which it has clearly deviated.
4. The Backlash
a. The States Rebel: Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Enacted to LimitEminent
Domain Power in the Wake ofKelo
More than a year after the United State's Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, the
public concern regarding eminent domain abuse continues unabated.75 Legislators
in 47 states have introduced, considered or passed legislation limiting the
government's eminent domain powers in instances of private use since the Court's
unpopular decision in June of 2005.76 Thirty states, out of the forty-five that were
in session, enacted legislation aimed at curbing eminent domain abuse." Of these
73 Ibid, at 522 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
7 Ibid, at 523.
7 Grass roots groups such as the Institute for Justice and its property rights counterpart, the
Castle Coalition, have been tracking and encouraging policy movements at the State and
local level. See www.castlecoalition.com and www.ij.org, for more information on these
groups.
76 Lisa Knepper and John Kramer, 'Iowa Legislature Overrides Eminent Domain Reform
Veto: Historic Event Secures Greater Property Protection', 14 July 2006, http://www.
castlecoalition.org/media/releases/7 14-06pr.html.
77 Alabama (2005 AL SB 68A), Alaska (2005 AK HB 319), Colorado (2006 CO HB 1411),
Delaware (2005 DE SB 217), Florida (2006 FL HB 1567, 2006 FL HB 1569, 2006 FL V
8), Georgia (2005 GA HB 1313, 2005 GA HB 1306), Idaho (2006 IBID SB 1243, 2006
IBID SB 1247, 2006 IBID HB 555), Indiana (2006 IN HB 1010), Illinois (2005 IL SB
3086), Iowa (2005 IA HB 2351), Kansas (2005 KS SB 323), Kentucky (2006 KY HB
508), Louisiana (2006 LA SB 1, 2006 LA SB 43A, 2006 LA HB 707), Maine (2005 ME
HB 1310), Michigan (2005 MI SJR E), Minnesota (2005 MN SB 2750), Missouri (2006
MO HB 1944), Nebraska (2005 NE LB 924), New Hampshire (2005 NH SB 287), North
Carolina (2006 NC HB 1965), Ohio (2005 OH SB 1667), Pennsylvania (2005 PA HB
2054, 2005 PA SB 881), South Carolina (2006 SC SB 1031), South Dakota (2006 SD
HB 1080), Tennessee (2005 TN HB 3450), Texas (2005 TX SB 7B), Utah (2006 UT SB
117), Vermont (2005 VT SB 246), West Virginia (2006 WV HB 4048), Wisconsin (2005
WI AB 657). Information taken from Castle Coalition, LegislativeAction Since Kelo, available
at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf (last
visited at 7 October 2006).
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thirty states, twenty-seven governors have signed reform legislation into law.' Iowa,
Arizona and New Mexico are the only states whose governors vetoed eminent
domain reform, and Iowa is the first to override such a veto.79 Local governments
are also taking measures to protect their homeowners, with more than 70 cities
and counties introducing their own bills to restrict the use of eminent domain.o
Citizens in Arizona, California, Idaho, Florida, Georgia, Oregon Louisiana,
Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota and South Carolina voted on
ballot measures directed at curbing eminent domain abuse. Montana, which was
previously scheduled to vote on two constitutional initiatives aimed at private
property rights and limiting the purposes for which the government may take
private property respectively, did not vote on the ballot measures because they
were both withdrawn by their sponsors.' After the election the number of states
that have limited eminent domain has risen from 30 to 34.82
b. United States Congress Gets Into the Act
Although both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate have introduced
numerous bills attempting to restrict eminent domain abuse since the Supreme
Court decided Kelo, HR 3058 is the only one to survive.83 The bill, which became
law on November 30, 2 0 0 5 ," provides that 'no funds in this Act may be used to
support any Federal, State, or local projects that seek to use the power of eminent
domain, unless eminent domain is employed only for a public use.' The bill further
specifically states that 'public use shall not be construed to include economic
development that primarily benefits private entities.' In addition, the bill provides
that the Government Accounting Office conduct a study on the nationwide use of
eminent domain, including the procedures used and the results accomplished on a
state-by-state basis as well as the impact on individual property owners and on the
affected communities." The study, which was supposed to be submitted to Congress
within 12 months of the enactment of the Act, has yet to be submitted. Obviously,
30 September 2006 has come and gone. HR 5576, an appropriations bill for
78 See Knepper and Kramer, 'Iowa Legislature Overrides Eminent Domain Reform Veto:
Historic Event Secures Greater Property Protection' (note 88 above).
7 Ibid.
80 See Castle Coalition's Legislative Center, available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/
legislation/local/index.asp (last visited at 17 October 2006).
81 See http://sos.mt.gov/ELB/archives/2006/BallotIssues.asp. (last visited on 12 November
2006).
82 John Kramer and Lisa Knepper, '2006 Election Wrap Up: Voters Overwhelmingly Passed
Eminent Domain Reform', 8 November 2006, available at http://www.castlecoalition.com/
medialreleases/1 L8_06pr.html.
83 See Castle Coalition, LegisLative Center: Current Proposed Federal Legislation On Eminent
Domain, available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/federal/index.html (last
visited on 17 October 2006).
8 Ibid; HR 3058, 109th Cong (2005) (enacted).
85 HR 3058, 109th Cong §726 (2005) (enacted).
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Fiscal Year 2007, is currently being debated. 6 If enacted as presently written, it
will keep the restrictions in HR 3058 in place.
Other bills are more sharply critical of eminent domain abuse, such as the
Private Property Protection Act of 2005. That Act, also known as HR 4128, provides
that: 'No State or political subdivision of a State shall exercise its power of eminent
domain, or allow the exercise of such power by any person or entity to which such
power has been delegated, over property to be used for economic development or
over property that is subsequently used for economic development, if that State or
political subdivision receives Federal economic development funds during any fiscal
year in which it does so'. It also prohibits the federal government from condemning
property for economic development87 The bill passed the House on November 3,
2005 but it has languished in the Senate Judiciary Committee ever since.8
c. Recent Court Decisions After Kelo
i. Board of County Commissioners of Muskogee County v Lowery
In one of the first state supreme court decisions issued after Kelo, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that 'economic development alone does not constitute a public
purpose[.]'"8 In that case, Muskogee County brought condemnation proceedings
against landowners for the purpose of acquiring right-of-way easements for the
placement of three water pipelines, two of which would solely service Energetix,
LLC, a private electric generation plant proposed for construction and operation
in the County. The landowners objected to the proceedings 'primarily on the basis
that the takings were not for a valid public purpose, but rather an unlawful taking
of private property for private purpose.'" The trial court sided with the County
but the appellate court reversed, holding that the takings were unlawful because
they were for the 'direct benefit of a private company' and not for 'public
purposes.'9 ' The County appealed.
Agreeing with the appellate court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned:
'We adhere to the strict construction of eminent domain statutes in keeping with
our precedent, mindful of the critical importance of the protection of individual
private property rights as recognized by the framers of both the US Constitution
and the Oklahoma Constitution. If we were to construe "public purpose" so broadly
as to include economic development within those terms, then we would effectively
86 Castle Coalition, Legislative Action Since Kelo, available at http://www.castlecoalition.
org/pdf/publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf (last visited at 7 October 2006).
87 See Castle Coalition, Legislative Center: Current Proposed Federal Legislation On Eminent
Domain (note 95 above).
88 Lisa Knepper and John Kramer, 'US Senate Eminent Domain Reform Deadline Tomorrow
Time is Running Out For Federal Government to Stop Funding Abuse', 29 September
2006, http://www.castlecoalition.org/media/releases/9_29_06pr.html.
89 Board of County Comm'rs ofMuskogee County v Lowery, 136 P3d 639, 650 (2006).
90 Ibid, at 644.
9 bid, at 645.
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abandon a basic limitation on government power by "wash[ing] out any distinction
between private and public use of property-and thereby effectively delet[ing] the
words 'for public use' from [the constitutional provisions limiting governmental
power of eminent domain.]' 9 2
The court specifically distinguished this case from Kelo: 'Contrary to the
Connecticut statute applicable in Kelo, which expressly authorized eminent domain
for the purpose of economic development, we note the absence of such express
Oklahoma statutory authority for the exercise of eminent domain in furtherance
of economic development in the absence of blight'.93
The court explained that its decision was 'reached on the basis of Oklahoma's
own special constitutional eminent domain provisions[.]' The court observed
that while the Takings Clause of the US Constitution provides 'nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation,' the Oklahoma
Constitution places further restrictions by expressly stating that 'no private property
shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without compensation.'95 The
Court held that although the Oklahoma constitution expressly lists exceptions for
common law easements by necessity and drains for agricultural, mining and sanitary
purposes, the proposed purpose of economic development did not fall within any
of these categories:9' 'To permit the inclusion of economic development alone in
the category of "public use" or "public purpose" would blur the line between "public"
and "private" so as to render our constitutional limitations on the power of eminent
domain a nullity. If property ownership in Oklahoma is to remain what the framers
of our Constitution intended it to be, this we must not do'. Accordingly, the
court held that 'economic development alone does not constitute a public purpose
and therefore, does not constitutionally justify the County's exercise of eminent
domain.'98
ii. Burien v Strobel Family Investments
The Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed a trial court decision holding that
the City's exercise of eminent domain to condemn a restaurant for a new 'Town
Square' development was not arbitrary or capricious.99 The decision makes no
mention of Kelo or the recent public use versus public purpose debate. The court
simply applied Washington's three-part test in evaluating eminent domain: 'For a
proposed condemnation to be lawful, the condemning authority must prove that
92 Ibid, at 647. (quotations and brackets in original) (citing Kelo, 545 US 469, (2005)
(O'Connor, J, dissenting)).
9 Ibid, at 650.
94 Ibid, at 651.
9 Jbid, at 652.
96 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
98 Ibid, at 650.
9 Burien v Strobel Family Investments, 2006 Wash App LEXIS 1136, 12-13 (12 June 2006).
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(1) the use is really public, (2) the public interest requires it, and (3) the property
appropriated is necessary for that purpose'.1oo
The landowner questioned whether the condemnation is 'necessary,' specifically
arguing that the City might sell a portion of the property to a private developer,
which would benefit that private entity and not the City."o' The court pointed
out, however, that the City Council specifically determined that the property would
be used only for public streets, public parks, or public parking.102 Moreover, the
court explained that '[where property is taken, ... with the intention of using it
for a certain purpose specified in the ordinance authorizing the taking, as was
done in this case, the city, doubtless, has the authority to change said contemplated
use to another and entirely different use, whensoever the needs and requirements
of the city suggest.>'1 o In holding that the city council's determination that the
property was 'reasonably necessary and required' for the development, the court
reasoned: 'When it comes to such discretionary details as the particular land chosen,
the amount of land needed, or the kinds of legal interests in that land that are
necessary for the project, many Washington decisions have said that the condemnor's
judgment on these matters will be overturned only if there is proof of actual fraud
or such arbitrary and capricious conduct as would amount to constructive fraud'.
Given the absence of actual or constructive fraud, the court held that the City's
determination to condemn the entire property was necessary to facilitate a public
use.
iii. City of Norwood v Homey
The Ohio Supreme Court was the first state supreme court to accept an eminent
domain case after Kelo.'" In City ofNorwood v Horney, the Ohio Supreme Court
unanimously held that 'an economic or financial benefit alone is insufficient to
satisfy the public-use requirement of [the Ohio Constitution].'1 In this case, the
City of Norwood entered into a contract with Rookwood Partners Ltd,
('Rookwood') in order to redevelop the plaintiffs' neighborhood. When Rookwood
could not negotiate the sales of certain properties the City initiated condemnation
proceedings. Pursuant to the City code, an urban-renewal study was completed
before the City instituted the eminent domain proceedings. The study concluded
that the neighborhood was a 'deteriorating area' as that term is defined in the
Norwood Code."*
10 Ibid, at 6. (citations omitted).
101 Ibid, at 8.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid, at *9. (quotations and citations omitted).
10' John Kramer and Lisa Knepper, 'Ohio Supreme Court Accepts Eminent Domain Abuse
Case', 3 October 2005, http://www.ij.org/private-property/norwood/10 3_05pr.html.
105 City ofNorwood v Horney, 853 NE2d 1115, 1142 (2006).
106 Ibid.
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At trial, the court found that the study 'contained numerous flaws and errors'
and the City's planning director testified only that the neighborhood 'probably
would' deteriorate or was in danger of deteriorating or becoming a blighted
area.' Based upon this evidence, the trial court found that the City abused its
discretion insofar as it had found that the neighborhood was a 'slum, blighted or
deteriorated area."'o The court concluded, however, that the City did not abuse
its discretion in finding that the neighborhood was a 'deteriorating area."09 The
landowners appealed.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically
declined to hold 'economic benefits alone to be a sufficient public use for a valid
taking."'o The court found that analysis by the Supreme Court of Michigan in
County of Wayne v Hathcock"' and the dissenting judges of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut and the dissenting justices of the US Supreme Court in Kelo, are
'better models' for interpreting the Ohio Constitution.112 In applying the analysis
therefrom, the court held that 'an economic or financial benefit alone is insufficient
to satisfy the public-use requirement in the Ohio Constitution. Based upon that
holding, any taking grounded solely on financial gain is void as a matter of law
and the courts owe no deference to a legislative finding that the proposed taking
will provide financial benefit to a community."' The court explained that '[a]
Ithough economic benefit can be considered as a factor among others in determining
whether there is a sufficient public use and benefit in a taking, it cannot serve as
the sole basis for finding such benefit."'
Next, the court turned to the City's eminent domain statute. The court
determined that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to statutes that regulate
the use of eminent-domain powers and that courts should apply 'heightened
scrutiny' when reviewing such statutes."' The court held that the use of the term
'deteriorating area' as a standard for determining whether private property is subject
to appropriation was 'void for vagueness and offends due process rights because it
fails to afford a property owner fair notice and invites subjective interpretation." 6
The court found that 'deteriorating area' was a 'standardless standard' and that the
City code 'merely recites a host of subjective factors that invite ad hoc and selective
enforcement."'
107 Ibid, at 1126.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
"o Ibid, at 1141.
1" 684 NW2d 765 (2004).
112 Horney, 853 NE2d at 1141.
"1 Ibid, at 1142.
114 Ibid, at 1141.
"1 Ibid, at 1123.
116 Ibid, at 1146.
117 Ibid, at 1145.
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The court further held that in any event the term could not be used as a standard
for a taking because it 'inherently incorporates speculation as to the future condition
of the property into the decision ... rather than focusing that inquiry on the
property's condition at the time of the proposed taking.'"" The court reasoned
that ' [s] uch a speculative standard is inappropriate in the context of eminent domain,
even under the modern, broad interpretation of 'public use.""' Moreover, '[a]
municipality has no authority to appropriate private property for only a
contemplated or speculative use in the future.'1 20
B. Just Compensation
Just compensation is an essential element of the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain. An individual has a fundamental and constitutional right to
compensation when his land is taken for the public use. 'Compensation' as used in
the constitutional provision as a limitation upon the power of eminent domain
implies a full and complete equivalent (usually monetary) for the loss sustained by
the owner whose land has been taken or damaged. Nothing short of actual payment
constitutes just compensation. 12' This applies to all property put to use by the
condemning party (private land, swamp, etc).12 2 Restraint of use of property cannot
be imposed, even for a temporary period without payment of compensation
(however, reasonable conditions may be imposed).123
Just compensation is normally measured by the fair market value of the property
at the time of the taking. It should put the owner of the condemned property in as
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. The emphasis is
on justice, and the compensation system should not sacrifice justice for efficiency.
The right to claim compensation is not dependent upon the mode of appropriation,
nor need the condemnee be concerned in this respect whether the property is
actually devoted to the purpose for which it was acquired.' 24
The constitutional provision obligating the condemnor to pay compensation
is strictly construed in favor of the condemnee. Thus the owner's right to
"1 Ibid, at 1146.
11 Ibid, at 1145.
120 Ibid. For an extended discussion of the 'Kelo Revolution' and its aftermath, see Nicole
Stelle Garnett, 'The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain', 105 Mich L Rev
101 (2006); Timothy J Dowling, 'How to Think About Kelo After the Shouting Stops', 38
Urb Law 191 (2006); Gideon Kanner, 'Kelo v New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and
Bad Judgment', 38 Urb Law 201 (2006).
121 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain 5 8.01.
122 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.42[1]; Peacock v County ofSacramento, 77 Cal Rptr 391
(Cal Ct App 1969); Beidler v Sanitary District, 71 NE 1118 (Ill 1904); Lorio v Sea Isle City,
212 A2d 802 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1965).
123 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain 5 1.42[2].
124 3 Nichol on Eminent Domain § 8.01.
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compensation is absolute and the condemnor has no right to impose conditions or
qualifications thereon. Whenever private property has been taken or damaged for
public use without compensation, the property owner may take action in a suit by
reason of inverse condemnation (a defacto or common law taking). 2 The
adjudication of the right to condemn is made only after a hearing at which the
owner/respondent/condemnee is entitled to be represented, and is the appropriate
occasion for contesting the validity of the taking.'2
C. Due Process
The principal bundle of rights held by an owner of real property about to be
acquired by a governmental agency under the power of eminent domain fall into
two categories: compensation and due process. Both derive from the US
Constitution's 5th and 14th Amendments. Beyond these rights are rights, mainly
procedural, conferred by statutes under which government agencies actually go
about acquiring property by compulsory purchase. Once a proceeding in eminent
domain is contested, then administrative process which attaches to such proceedings
are usually guaranteed both by state and federal constitution and by state
administrative procedure statutes. Among the procedural rights commonly held
by owners of real property about to be condemned by a government agency:
(a) The right to notice. Actual notice is usually required with respect to affected
landowners (those whose interest in property are being taken or damaged by the
governmental action). Property owners with a more generalized interest in the
condemnation are often held to be entitled to some notice, usually by
publication. 2 7
(b) The right to a hearing. If the matter is contested, then the right of the
landowner is usually to a contested case hearing. This includes the right to call and
cross-examine witnesses and present other evidence. Intervention in such hearings
to do the same things depends on the degree of interest in the proceedings that a
potential intervenor can show. The hearing, of course, may be before a court rather
than an agency tribunal, depending upon the state statutory language setting out
eminent domain procedures.
From a constitutional perspective, it is irrelevant what body (court or agency)
actually provides the due process.1 2 8 Thus, for example, the Santa Cruz
Redevelopment Agency in California condemned an easement for public parking
over a private parking area after negotiations with the landowner failed, by first
125 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 8.01.
126 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain $ 26A05[1].
127 See In the Matter of the Decision of the State of South Dakota Water Management Board
Approving Water Permit No 1791-2, 351 NW 2d 119, 123 (1984).
128 Ibid. See also Weiner v State ofNebraska Department ofRoads, 137 NW 2d 852 (1965).
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giving notice to the landowner, then holding a hearing, then adopting a resolution
of public necessity, then filing a complaint in eminent domain in court, all within
a 6 week period. The right to take was not decided by the trial court until 2 years
later, however, only to be overturned by the California Court of Appeals three
years later because the landowner's statutory right to raise certain objections at the
trial had been violated.12 9 In the course of its opinion, the court set out the statutory
rights of objection which all landowners in California have in compulsory purchase
cases: 130
a. The government agency is not authorized by statute to exercise the power of
eminent domain for the purpose stated in the complaint;
b. The stated purpose is not a public use;
c. The agency does not intend to devote the property described in the complaint
to the stated purpose;
d. There is no reasonable probability that the agency will devote the described
property to the stated purpose within seven years, or within 10 years where the
property is taken pursuant to the Federal Highway Act of 1973, or such longer
period as is reasonable;
e. The described property is not subject to the power of eminent domain for the
stated purpose;
f. The described property is sought to be acquired pursuant to a statutory section
on excess condemnation;
g. The described property is sought to be acquired pursuant to condemnation for
a more necessary public use, but the defendant property owner has the right to
continue the public use to which the property is appropriated, as a joint use;
h. Any other ground provided by law.
D. Inverse Condemnation
A landowner may recover just compensation for a taking of property even though
condemnation proceedings, under the power of eminent domain, have not been
instituted by the state. The process for doing so is aptly called 'inverse
condemnation.' When the challenge is to 'public use,' as in Midkiff the court can
enjoin the action. If public use is not in issue, the action is for compensation. As
the Court explained in United States v Clarke: 'There are important legal and
practical differences between an inverse condemnation suit and a condemnation
proceeding. Although a landowner's action to recover just compensation for a taking
by physical intrusion has come to be referred to as "inverse" or "reverse"
condemnation, the simple terms "condemn" and "condemnation" are not
129 Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v Izant, 43 Cal Rptr 2d 366 (1995).
130 Ibid.
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commonly used to described such an action. Rather, a "condemnation" proceeding
is commonly understood to be an action brought by a condemning authority such
as the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain'.13 '
The phrase 'inverse condemnation' appears to be one that was coined simply as
a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just
compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have
been instituted. As defined by one land use planning expert, inverse condemnation
is 'a cause ofaction against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property
which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.' 3 2 A landowner is entitled to bring such an action as a result of 'the self-
executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to
compensation.' 133 A condemnation proceeding, by contrast, typically consists of
an action by the condemnor to effect a taking and acquire title. The phrase 'inverse
condemnation,' as a common understanding of that phrase would suggest, simply
describes an action that is the 'inverse' or 'reverse' of a condemnation proceeding.
There are also important practical differences between condemnation
proceedings and actions by landowners to recover compensation for 'inverse
condemnation.' Depending upon the applicable statute, condemnation proceedings
require various affirmative actions on the part of the condemning authority. On
the other hand, to accomplish a taking by seizure, a condemning authority need
only occupy the land in question. Such a taking thus shifts to the landowner the
burden to discover the encroachment and to take affirmative action to recover just
compensation.
Likewise, the choice of the condemning authority to take property by physical
invasion rather than by a formal condemnation action may also have important
monetary consequences. The value of property taken by a governmental body is
ascertained as of the date of taking.14 In a condemnation proceeding, the taking
generally occurs sometime during the course of the proceeding, and thus
compensation is based on a relatively current valuation of the land.' 5 When a
taking occurs by physical invasion, on the other hand, the usual rule is that the
time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking, and '[i]t is that event which gives
rise to the claim for compensation and fixes the date as of which the land is to be
valued."36
131 States v Clarke, 445 US 253, 255 (1980) (emphasis in original).
132 Donald G Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law (St Paul: West
Publishing Co, 1971), p 328 (emphasis added).
133 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 25.41.
134 United States v Miller, 317 US 369, (1943).
135 See Louis Orgel, 1 Valuation in Eminent Domain § 21, n 29 (2nd ed, 1953).
136 United States v Dow, 357 US 17 (1958).
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II. Regulatory Takings
The taking of private property without compensation is unconstitutional under
the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution ('nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.'). While arguably drafted principally
to protect private landowners from physical takings without compensation, since
at least 1922 and the decision of the US Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co v
Mahon,17 a regulation of land which goes 'too far' is also a taking for which
government must pay compensation. There are two applicable branches of
regulatory takings: categorical or total, and partial.
A. Per Se or Total Takings: The Lucas Rule
A land use regulation totally takes property by regulation when it leaves the
landowner without 'economically beneficial use' of land. The land may have value.
Indeed, it may even have some limited, 'salvage' uses such as for walking or
picnicking. But if it has no economically beneficial use, then the government must
pay for the land as if it had condemned it, or lift the offending regulation and
potentially pay for the time during which the unconstitutional regulation affected
the use of the relevant land. These are the rules of Lucas v South Carolina Coastal
Council,'38 and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County of
Los Angeles.139
In Lucas, a state coastal zone protection statute prevented David Lucas from
constructing two beachfront houses on two separate lots. The statute prevented
development forward of a beach line in order to protect coastal habitat, plant,
animal and marine species, the natural environment and tourism. Remaining legal
uses included walking, limited camping and picnicking. The US Supreme Court
reversed the supreme court of South Carolina, holding that a regulation which
removes all productive or economically beneficial use from a parcel of land is a
regulatory taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Court
emphasized use, not value, in holding that the remaining permitted uses were not
economically beneficial. The court imposed no limitations on this per se, categorical
rule except for two exceptions briefly noted below. Observing that too often land
use regulations having as their principal purpose the preservation of the environment
have forced a single landowner to bear the burden of such public benefits, the
Court said: 'Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with'.140
137 260 US 393 (1922).
138 505 US 1003 (1992).
139 482 US 304 (1987).
1o Lucas, 505 US 1003 at 1027.
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Closely following this reasoning in Lucas, a Maryland court held that an open
space zoning category effectively foreclosed all economically viable use when applied
to private property, resulting in a total taking: 'While a strong argument can be
made that the statutory scheme here at issue ... is for the common good, that
argument, if resolved favorably to the County, does not, under Lucas, resolve the
matter. Even if it were for the common good, it still may cause an unconstitutional
taking if it, as it does in the case sub judice, results in the loss of all viable economic
use' 
141
On the other hand, a Florida appeals court held that a recreational use was
sufficiently economically beneficial to take a case out of the per se takings category
of regulatory takings because that was one of the uses being made of the subject
parcel and there was some evidence that this was one of the reasons the landowner
had acquired the parcel.142 Similarly, an Ohio appeals court held that the denial of
a conditional use permit for mineral extraction was not a total regulatory taking
since the owner was not denied all economically viable use where the property was
zoned for many other uses and could be sold to a developer who could use the
property in a manner consistent with zoning laws.14 1
The US Supreme Court set out two exceptions to its categorical rule-situations
in which the proscribed use interests would not be a part of the owner's title to
begin with: nuisance and background principles of a state's law of property.
1. The Nuisance Exception
If the law of the jurisdiction would allow neighbors or the state to prohibit the
proposed uses of land because they would constitute either public or private
nuisances, then government could prohibit them without providing compensation.
This is because such nuisances are always unlawful and are never part of a
landowner's tide to begin with, so prohibiting them would not deprive a landowner
of a property right. The Court gave as examples laws that would prevent the
construction of a nuclear power plant on an earthquake fault line, or the filling of
lakefront land so as to raise the water level and flood neighboring land.
While most nuisance exceptions have generally been applied to mining cases'
at least one (sharply divided) court has upheld the denial of a permit to construct
a marina even if the owner were left with no economically beneficial use, on the
ground that the additional traffic generated would constitute a nuisance and
141 Steel v Cape Corporation, 677 A2d 634, 645 (Md Ct Spec App 1996).
142 State ofFlorida, Department ofEnvtl Protection v Burgess, 772 So 2d 540 (Fla Dist Ct App
2000).
14 State ex rel Shelly Materials, Inc v Clark County Bd of Comm'r, 2005 Ohio 6682 (Ohio Ct
App 2005).
'4 See, eg, Ritb Energy, Inc v United States, 44 Fed Cl 366 (Fed Cl 1999); Kinross Copper Corp
v Oregon, 98 P2d 833 (Or App 2001); Machipongo Land and Coal Company, Inc v
Commonwealth, 799 A2d 751 (Pa 2002) (holding that the danger to public waterways
from mining pollution constituted a public nuisance).
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therefore constitute an exception to the categorical rule."' The Florida Supreme
Court has also extended 'nuisance exception' status to the closing of a motel used
for prostitution and drug dealing, though not to an apartment used occasionally
for drug transactions, which the City of Miami also closed, in Keshbro Inc v City of
Miami.'4 ' To the same effect, State v Rezcallah,147 holding padlocking of property
for one year as a result of drug activity not to be a nuisance exception and not
substantially advancing a legitimate state interest in curtailing the use and sales of
drugs.
2. The Background Principles Exception
Likewise, if a regulation is consistent with a background principle of a state's law
of property, again there would be no deprivation of a cognizable right in property.
While the Court gave no examples of such a background principle, customary
rights and land held subject to public trust are emerging as such background
principles in several jurisdictions.
a. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principle
Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that a state holds public trust
lands, waters and living resources in trust for the benefit of its citizens, establishing
the right of the public to fully enjoy them for a variety of public uses and
purposes.' Implied in this definition are limitations on the private use of such
waters and land which are impressed with the public trust, as well as limitations on
how the state may transfer interests in such land and water, particularly if such
transfer will prevent public use. Such definitions and duties analytically flow from
the dual nature of title in public trust lands and water. On the one hand, the
public has the right to use and enjoy the land and water-the res of the public
trust-for such activities as commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and related
public purposes. This is the so-called jus publicum. On the other hand, since fully
one-third of public trust property is reportedly in private hands rather than public,
private property rights coexist with public rights in much land and water subject
to the public trust doctrine. This is the so-called jus privatum. 14
The issue, of course, is the extent to which the public trust doctrine can legally
eliminate private property rights without compensation required by the US
Constitution's Fifth Amendment. To the extent that such rights are recognized,
they would constitute a diminution of the fee simple much like the recognized
private limitations on fee simple such as leaseholds, easements, and the burdens of
145 Windward Marina, LLC v City ofDestin, 743 So2d 635 (Fla Dist Ct App 1999).
146 801 So2d 864 (Fla 2001).
147 702 NE2d 81 (Ohio 1998).
148 David Slade, Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work, (Coastal States Organization, 2nd
ed, 1990), p 4 .
149 Ihid, at 2, 230.
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covenants running with the land. These are interests held by strangers to the basic
title of the landowner, and are therefore not 'part of his title to begin with.' In the
same fashion, if public trust rights are valid, then these also represent interests in
private land which are not part of the owner's title to begin with-a valid,
background principle of property law which provides an exception to the per se
categorical regulatory takings rule of the Lucas case.
The issue of regulatory taking in connection with public trust arises most
frequently when a state court or legislature 'reaffirms' the public's trust 'rights' on
private property. This occurs when a state:
1. imposes restrictions on privately-held trust lands;
2. requires public access across private land or access to trust lands or water;
3. expands the scope of public activities permitted under the guise of public trust
rights. Most public trust lands are submerged, tidal or water-flowed. However,
some courts expand the application of public trust doctrine to 'dry-sand' and
other more useable and developable areas.
Many courts find the public trust doctrine applies at least to submerged and
tide-flowed lands. Thus, in Illinois Central RR Co, v Illinois,150 the US Supreme
Court held that the Illinois legislature could not transfer in fee simple land under
Lake Michigan because that land was held in public trust for the people of the
state. However, the state could sell small parcels of public trust land the use of
which would promote the public interest (docks, piers, wharves) so long as this
did not impair the public interest in the lake and the remaining submerged land.
In Phillips Petroleum Co v Mississippi,' the Court extended the public trust to all
lands under waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tides.
Courts also have rejected takings claims brought by landowners whose plans
for development are thwarted by the application of the public trust doctrine. In
Orion Corp v State,'52 the court held that a landowner could have no investment-
backed expectations in its land development plans, frustrated after purchase by a
series of coastal and tideland protective statutes, because all of Washington's
shoreline was impressed with a public trust which, of course, could not be alienated.
However, the court noted that the statutes and regulations were more restrictive
than would result from a reasonable application of the public trust doctrine alone,
and that to the extent they left the landowner without any economically viable use
of the land, a regulatory taking would occur. A federal court in Madison v Graham53
upheld what it considered to be a 'narrow' use by the public of streams and
streambeds for recreational uses against a claim of takings by a landowner brought
150 146 US 387 (1892).
151 484 US 469 (1988).
152 747 P2d 1062 (Wash 1987).
'5 126 F Supp 2d 1320 (D Montana 2001).
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on a 'right to exclude' theory. So also the court in National Audubon Society v
Superior Court ofAlpine County,1 4 rejected a private takings claim on public trust
grounds.
Perhaps the biggest extension of the public trust doctrine is represented by
Matthews v Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,1" extending the public trust doctrine to
private dry sand beach areas for both access to and limited use of the ocean and
foreshore. The court held that the public rights to the water would be meaningless
unless the public were guaranteed both access and a place to rest intermittently.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin even extended the public trust doctrine to a
weedland (which became a bird sanctuary) created by the property owner in the
course of development in R WDocks Slips v Wisconsin.15 ' Finally, in a pre-Lucas
case, a Texas court of appeals held that when a hurricane moved a beach vegetation
line hundreds of feet, landowner's home was now on the 'public' beach easement
(presumably public trust) and so could not be rebuilt.
Also building upon the growing body of law finding private land impressed
with a public trust may be regulated with impunity as a 'background principles'
exception is McQueen v South Carolina Coastal Council.1 17 McQueen purchased
two noncontiguous lots adjacent to man-made canals in the early 1960's, but left
them unimproved until the early 1990's, by which time neighboring lots were
improved with bulkheads and retaining walls, while McQueen's had 'reverted' to
tidelands. When McQueen applied to the appropriate state authority for permission
to backfill his lots and build his own bulkhead, the state denied the requisite permit
on the ground that it would destroy the 'critical environment' on those lots. Both
a special master and the court of appeals and supreme court agreed (eventually)
that the denial left the lots without any economically beneficial use and so resulted
in a total taking under Lucas.
Initially, the state supreme court nevertheless denied relief because it found
'confusion' over whether the 'investment-backed expectations' standard-a 'partial
takings' standard as appears below-applied to total takings. Nevertheless, the
court eventually denied compensation on the ground that South Carolina holds
'presumptive title' to land below the high water mark and moreover 'wetlands
created by the encroachment of navigable tidal water belong to the state.' Moreover,
the state also has 'exclusive right to control land below the high water mark for the
public benefit... and cannot permit activity that substantially impairs the public
interest in marine life, water quality, or public access.' The court then held that so
much of McQueen's lots as had 'reverted to tidelands' were 'public trust property
subject to control of the State.'
154 658 P2d 709 (Cal 1983).
155 471 A2d 355 (NJ 1984).
156 628 NW2d 781 (Wis 2001).
157 580 SE2d 116 (SC 2003).
102
TAKINGS: PHYSICAL AND REGULATORY
Not all courts have been so quick to accept extensions of the public trust doctrine,
and even those which accept it within its traditional limits often permit limited
private use of public trust resources. Thus, in Kootenai Environmental Alliance,
Inc, v State Board of Land Commissioners,18 the court approved the leasing of state
lands impressed with a public trust to a private club for the construction,
maintenance and use of private docking facilities on a bay in a navigable lake, on
the ground that such lease and use was 'not incompatible' with the public trust
imposed on the property.
Moving to applying the public trust doctrine to private land, the court in Bell
v Town of Wells Beach,'9 held that attempts to cross private land to reach public
land for recreational purposes in accordance with the state's Public Trust and
Intertidal Land Act resulted in a taking of private property without compensation.
Another court also refused to expand statutory declarations of public trust to permit
access across private land to reach inter-tidal lands in Opinion of the Justices:'60
'The permanent physical intrusion into the property of private persons, which the
bill would establish, is a taking of property within even the most narrow construction
of that phrase possible under the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and the
United States ... The interference with private property here involves a wholesale
denial of an owner's right to exclude the public'.'
To the same effect is Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches),16 2 in
which the court held that a new statute providing for access to tide-flowed public
trust shoreline across abutting private land was a taking: 'When the government
unilaterally authorized a permanent public easement across private lands, this
constitutes a taking requiring compensation... Because the bill provides no
compensation for the landowners whose property may be burdened by the general
recreational easement established for public use, it violates the prohibition contained
in our State and Federal Constitutions against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. Although the state has the power to permit
a comprehensive beach access and use program by using its eminent domain power
and compensating private property owners, it may not take property rights without
compensation by legislative decree'. 163
The same court drove home these advisory points when five years later it
considered an actual case and controversy 1 6 in which forty beachfront property
owners sued the state on regulatory taking grounds when the state moved a public
trust lands boundary line inland from the mean high water mark: 'Having
158 671 P2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
' 557 A2d 168 (Me 1989).
160 313 NE2d 561 (Mass 1974).
161 Ibid, at 568.
162 649 A.2d 604 (NH 1994).
163 Ibid, at 611.
164 Purdie v Attorney General, 732 A2d 442 (NH 1999).
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determined that New Hampshire common law limits public ownership of the
shorelands to the mean high water mark, we conclude that the legislature went
beyond common law limits by extending public trust rights to the highest high
water mark ... Because (the statute) unilaterally authorizes the taking of private
shoreland for public use and provides no compensation to landowners whose
property has been appropriated, it violates (the State Constitution) and the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution against the taking of property for public
use without just compensation . ... Although it may be desirable for the State to
expand public beaches to cope with increasing crowds, the State may not do so
without compensating affected landowners'.'65
b. Customary Law as a Background Principle
Customary rights in land usually arise when a particular group or class of persons
can show a right to do a particular thing or practice upon land which they neither
own nor otherwise possess the right to do, based upon past and unchallenged
practice extending back over some time. The claimant to the custom would, in
other words, be a trespasser on the land of another, but for the custom. The reception
of customary law in the United States was originally chilly despite its common,
though restricted, use in England. The reasons had much to do with the restrictions
on use resulting from the application of the doctrine, and the difficulties in
terminating a custom, once found or declared. This latter was of particular concern
to the legendary John Chipman Gray, of future interests and the rule against
perpetuity fame, whose concerns about custom were as follows: 'Especially it should
be remembered that they cannot be released, for no inhabitant, or body of
inhabitants, is entitled to speak for future inhabitants. Such rights form perpetuities
of the most objectionable character." 66
An early 19th century court put it well in Ackerman v Shelp,'67 in which a
custom was alleged to permit inhabitants of a town an easement to reach a riverbank:
'[I]f [this] custom.. .is to prevail according to the common law notion of it, these
lots must lie open forever to the surprise of unsuspecting owners, and to the
curtailing [of ] commerce, in its more advanced state, of the accommodation of
docks and wharves, when perhaps a tenth part of the lots now open would be all
sufficient as watering places; a principle of such extensive operation ought not to
be strained beyond the limits assigned to it in law. If [the]public convenience
requires highways to church, school, mill, market or water, they are obtainable in
a much more direct and rational manner under statute than by way of immemorial
usage and custom'.' 68
165 Ibid, at 447.
166 John Chipman Gray, The RuleAgainstPerpetuities (4th ed, 1942) § 586.
167 Ackerman v Shelp, 8 NJL 125 (NJ 1825).
161 Ibid, at 130-131.
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Despite this cautionary background concerning the problems associated with
custom, courts in the United States have declared public rights or rights of a huge
class of strangers to cross private land based exclusively on some version of customary
law. Perhaps the most famous of these is Oregon ex rel Thornton v Hay, 69 in which
the plaintiffs sought to prevent the Hays from constructing improvements on the
dry-sand beach portion of their lot between the high water line and the upland
vegetation line. Rejecting the proffered bases of prescriptive rights and easements,
the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs, sua sponte, extending customary rights
to virtually the entire population of Oregon: 'Because many elements of prescription
are present in this case, the state has relied upon the doctrine in support of the
decree below. We believe, however, that there is a better legal basis for affirming
the decree. The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the English doctrine
of custom. Strictly construed, prescription applies only to the specific tract of land
before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years
with tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom, on the other hand, can be
proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to
the southern boundary of the state ought to be treated uniformly'.170
Lest the reach of custom be misunderstood in a per se, total regulatory takings
context under Lucas, the same court in Stevens v City ofCannon Beach,1 7 1 responded
to a takings claim over the refusal of local government to grant a seawall permit on
customary rights interference grounds that the customary law of Oregon preventing
such construction was a background principle of state property law and therefore
an exception to the categorical total takings rule when a property owner was left
with no economically beneficial use of his land.
In two landmark cases,172 the Hawaii Supreme Court expanded previous rulings
to provide that native Hawaiians are entitled to exercise their state-constitutionally-
protected traditional and customary rights on land which is 'not fully developed'
whether or not such native Hawaiians actually reside or own property on their
land, provided they can show they have traditionally done so.
The two cases deal specifically with access rights and gathering rights, but,
without going into specific definitions, the supreme court indicated it did not
mean to restrict the definition of traditional and customary rights to these two
categories. However, in a subsequent decision, 7 1 the supreme court modified its
earlier decisions by holding that in order to exercise such traditional and customary
rights, a native Hawaiian needed to prove that such a right existed geographically
where claimed, and that such native Hawaiian was specifically entitled to exercise
169 462 P2d 671 (Or 1969).
1o Ibid, at 676.
171 854 P2d 449 (Or 1993).
172 Pele Defense Fund v Paty, 837 P2d 1247 (Haw 1992); Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v
Hawaii County Planning Commission, 903 P2d 1246 (Haw 1995).
173 Hawaii v Hanapi, 970 P2d 485 (Haw 1998).
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that right. In other words, such traditional and customary rights as are protected
by the Hawaii state constitution do not extend to every native Hawaiian and to
every parcel of land in the state. The second decision further specifically held that
such rights can only be exercised on undeveloped or less than fully developed land,
specifically holding that on land which is residentially-zoned with existing dwellings,
improvements and infrastructure it is 'always inconsistent' to permit the practice
of such rights. The subject parcel in the case consisted of several acres with but one
dwelling.
C. Statutes as Background Principles
More troubling is the occasional case finding background principles in preexisting
statutes, which would broaden the exception considerably and likely contrary to
the implications of Lucas which, after all, did involve the application of a statute.
Thus, for example, the supreme court of New Hampshire held that a 'positive law'
could be construed as a background principle if it were passed prior to the
landowner's acquisition of the subject parcel.17 4 Finally, in a strange twist on the
law of background principles exceptions, a court of appeals in Arizona denied a
takings claim by a landowner over whose property flowed (by state permit) water
for another landowner whose use of property (underground storage) depended
upon flowing streamwater across his private stream. The court held that the doctrine
of prior appropriation, upon which the permit was based, was a background
principle of Arizona's water law, rendering such a takings claim impossible under
a Lucas exception.
3. 'Use' vs 'Value' in Total Regulatory Takings
There is dicta in the recent US Supreme Court case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,17 1 which emphasizes value rather
than use in the application of the Lucas categorical rule, but it is clearly and
unequivocally dicta. The dicta is not surprising since the author of that opinion
filed a vigorous dissent to the Lucas categorical taking rule decision. Some state
courts also use value rather than use in deciding whether to apply the categorical
total regulatory taking rule."17 If the dicta should become the holding of a later
case, it would pretty much eviscerate the categorical total taking rule since there is
nearly always some value left in a parcel, whatever the land use restriction.
However, this is an unlikely interpretation given the recent US Supreme Court
decision in Lingle v Chevron'77 in which the Court set out at length its current
takings jurisprudence, including the Lucas rule as originally 'written.' The Court
174 Sanderson v Town of Candia, 787 A2d 167 (NH 2001).
1' 535 US 302 (2002).
176 See, eg, MCAssociates v Town of Cape Elizabeth, 773 A2d 439 (Me 2001) and Fichter ex rel
v State Board ofEnvironmental Protection, 2000 WL 33676710 (Me Super Ct 1 May 2000).
177 544 US 528 (2005).
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reviews four distinct categories of takings by regulation - two rare 'per se', one
partial (by far the more common) and unconstitutional conditions, none of which,
the Court is careful to point out, are affected by its holding in Lingle- 'We emphasize
that our holding today-that the 'substantially advances' formula is not a valid
takings test-does not require us to disturb any of our prior holdings.'17 8 While
not a part of the rule of the case, this summary does bear the stamp of a unanimous
Court, which in itself is a rarity in recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. It
is therefore worth setting out in some detail.
The court set out the two classes of taking: First, permanent physical invasion
of property-however minor-for which the State must provide compensation.
For this proposition, the Court cited its 1982 holding in Loretto v Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp,'7 9 in which the Court struck down a state law requiring
landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on apartment
buildings. 8 0 Second, where government regulations completely deprive a landowner
of 'all economically beneficial use' of the land, government must pay compensation
for a total regulatory taking except to the extent nuisance or the background
principles of a state's law of property restrict the landowner's intended use.'8 ' This
is, of course, the rule established in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council,'82
where two lots in a developed beachfront residential subdivision were rendered
unbuildable by a state coastal protection statute prohibiting any construction
thereon. The Court criticized the decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,18 1 making it clear that, rare as the deprivation of
all economically beneficial use will be, the Lucas per se rule is alive, well, and
applicable when government regulation results in such a total deprivation of use.
For the rest, as the Lucas majority readily concurred, Penn Central Transportation
Company v City of New York' 8 sets out the criteria for the more common partial
taking by governmental regulation, discussed in Part C below.
B. 'Temporary' Regulatory Takings
The same Tahoe-Sierra opinion affected slightly the application of the rule in First
Lutheran cited above. There, the Court held that a temporary taking, once proved,
178 Ibid, at 545. For an extensive discussion of the regulatory takings findings in Lingle, see RS
Radford, 'Just A Fleshwound? The Impact of Lingle v Chevron on Regulatory Takings
Law', 38 Urb Law 437 (2006); Daniel A Jacobs, 'Indigestion from Eating Crow: The
Impact of Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc on The Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine', 38
Urb Law 451 (2006).
' 458 US 419 (1982).
180 Ibid, at 441.
1' Lingle, 544 US 528 at 538.
182 505 US 1003 (1992).
183 535 US 302 (2002) (in an opinion written by Justice Stevens who dissented vigorously
from the Lucas majority opinion).
114 438 US 104 (1978).
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requires compensation, particularly where, as there, the offending regulation was
conceded for the sake of argument to be unconstitutional. The Tahoe-Sierra case
merely holds, again very narrowly, that a 3-year moratorium under the explicit
circumstances of the case was not always such a temporary taking. The Court was
careful to note that a moratorium might well be a regulatory taking under the First
Lutheran rule in some circumstances, but not in the situation presented in Tahoe-
Sierra (moratorium on development pending studies and regulations promulgated
by a bi-state agency designed to preserve the clarity of Lake Tahoe). Mills Land &'
Water Co v City ofHuntington Beach provides a good example.1 15 There, a California
court of appeals found a 20-year delay in obtaining local coastal zone program
approval to be a temporary taking by regulation. In Pettro v US,186 the federal
court of claims held the prevention of mining for 2 years during the pursuit by the
government of a quiet title action amounted to a temporary taking requiring
compensation.
C Partial Takings
A partial taking by regulation occurs when a land use regulation deprives a
landowner of use and value beyond the normal reduction, if any, caused by the
necessary exercise of the police power for the health, safety and welfare of the
people, but stops short of depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use.
The government's rationale for the regulation and the economic effect of the
regulation on the landowner are critical factors which a reviewing court weighs in
deciding whether a landowner has suffered a partial taking of property. Partial
takings are more common than total takings, but the standard-a balancing test
among the various factors-is somewhat more difficult to apply. As the Lucas case
suggested in footnote eight of its opinion, an owner who has suffered less than a
full deprivation of economically beneficial use '...might not be able to claim the
benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and
again, '[t]he economic impact of the regulation and... the extent to which the
regulation interfered with the distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly
relevant to the takings analysis generally.'
The case which the Court cites and from which it quotes above is Penn Central
Transportation Co v New York City, 1 7 in which the Court set out the framework
for deciding partial regulatory taking cases. The Court there upheld New York
City's Landmark Preservation Law, which effectively prohibited Penn Central from
constructing a fifty story office building over Grand Central Station, which Penn
Central owned. Penn Central claimed that the designation of the station as a historic
185 89 Cal Rptr 2d 52 (Cal Ct App 1999), rehearing granted, depublished on 14 December
1999, subsequent opinion on rehearing not for publication, remanded on 21 June 2000.
186 48 Fed Cl 136 (Fed Cl 2000).
187 438 US 104 (1978).
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landmark and the prohibition of its development plans constituted a taking of its
property without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the US Constitution. Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court suggested
'several factors' which have 'particular significance' when it engages in 'these
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries':
1. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with the distinct, investment-
backed expectations;
2. The character of the governmental action;
3. Whether the taking is physical or if 'the interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good. 18
Adjusting the benefits and the burdens, the relevant part of the third criteria, is
probably of little importance after Lucas given the Court's language there excoriating
regulation which merely confers a public good and for which the Court clearly
states the public as a whole should pay rather than a single landowner. That leaves
the economic effect on the landowner and the character of the government's action
as the primary focus of a partial regulatory taking case.
1. Economic Effect on the Landowner and Frustration of Investment-
Backed Expectations
As an initial matter, Courts are not consistent in dealing with the most critical
part of the 'economic effects' criterion: the investment-backed expectations of the
landowner. There are now two characterizations of these expectations: 'distinct,'
which the Court used in Penn Central, and 'reasonable,' which seems to have been
engrafted later in a different context. "I The distinction is worth examining briefly.
There is a difference between 'distinct' and 'reasonable' investment-backed
expectations. Distinct expectations are those which are clearly defined and
articulated. Reasonable expectations are those which, measured against some
objective standard, are rational for a landowner to hold under the circumstances of
the case, whether or not they are distinct. Using the latter characterization permits
a court to examine the factual context in which a landowner's expectations arise,
including, arguably, whether the landowner had notice of the offending regulations
when purchasing the property or formulating plans for development.
While many courts treat frustration of investment-backed expectations simply
as a subset of economic effect, some courts go to great pains to separate the two.
So it is in a recent decision of the Court of Claims in Cane Tennessee Inc, v US.'10
18 Ibid, at 124.
189 See Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 174 (1979).
190 57 Fed Cl 115 (Fed Cl 2003).
109
DAVID L CALLIES
In considering the extent of a regulatory taking, if any, on several of plaintiff's
parcels following denial of certain surface mining permits, the court found a
diminution of value of 49.6% of the relevant parcel (relevant parcel analysis in this
case is discussed below and is instructive). Citing various cases showing, first, that
the US Supreme Court has denied taking claims where the percentage of loss has
been 'comparable or greater' and second that a plaintiff must show 'serious financial
loss' for there to be a taking, the court held that the percentage of loss was too
small to decide this factor in plaintiff's favor.
Turning then to investment-backed expectations, the court then found them
to be minimal since plaintiff was involved in a high-risk industry (coal-mining)
even though plaintiffs had no experience in coal-mining, because plaintiff had
been advised in a financial services report that the required permits might not be
obtainable. This made it difficult for plaintiff to successfully claim that plaintiff
'actually believed in a certain outcome and entered into the program in reliance on
it.' The court then specifically held that 'Because a reasonably prudent investor
could not have believed that its investment was without regulatory risk, [plaintiff]
cannot now claim that it had reasonable investment-backed expectations.' Had
the standard been 'distinct' rather than 'reasonable' the court might well have
reached a different result on this criterion in the partial takings analysis.
2. Character of the Governmental Action
This standard has also 'morphed' into something different from the Court's original
meaning in Penn Central. As the Hodel case cited in the preceding subsection
indicates, it no longer means whether the taking was physical or regulatory (what
the Court clearly meant in Penn Central) but rather the police power basis for the
governmental action. Thus, the 'extraordinary' nature of the governmental action
in Hodel helped persuade the Court that a partial regulatory taking had occurred.
So also a court in Maine emphasized the importance of the character of the
governmental police power action in preserving sand dunes (citing Penn Central)
in Fichter ex rel v State Board of Environmental Protection.'" Finally, in the
aforementioned Cane Tennessee case, the court examined the character of the
governmental action and found that although aesthetics may have been a factor in
the denial of the requisite permits, there was enough evidence that they were denied
in part over concerns that surface mining on the relevant parcels would create
hazards dangerous to life and property, in particular with respect to potential
landslides. This factor, then, was at best a wash.
3. Legitimate State Interest
Finally, some courts decided regulatory takings cases under the 'legitimate
state interest' prong of the US Supreme Court's decision in Agins v City of
'9' 2000 WL 33676710 (Me Super Ct 1 May 2000).
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Tiburon.19 2 Thus, in State ex rel. Shemo v City ofMayfield Heights,' the Ohio
supreme court held that the city lacked any legitimate governmental health, safety
or welfare concerns in support of a planned development reclassification of realtor's
land which restricted it to single-family uses, and therefore the classification did
not substantially advance any legitimate city police power interest.19
However, in 2005, the US Supreme Court eliminated 'legitimate state interest'
as an independent ground for finding a taking under the Fifth Amendment, leaving
it as a ground for relief only under the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution
and its 'due process' clause. In Lingle v Chevron USA Inc,'15 the US Supreme Court
abolished the 'substantially advances a legitimate state interest' threshold standard
for determining when a land use regulation becomes a taking under the Fifth
Amendment to the US Constitution."' First established in the Court's 1980
decision, Agins v City of Tiburon,19 7 the standard was occasionally used by lower
courts, particularly in California, to invalidate regulations appearing to be devoid
of any identifiable governmental purpose.'98 As Justice Kennedy writes in his
concurring opinion, the standard still applies in 14th Amendment regulatory takings
challenges and, of course, is irrelevant to physical takings where the question is
whether government acquires property by eminent domain for the constitutionally-
required public use.'99 The opinion-which is unanimous-is important, however,
for the Court's summary of present regulatory taking law, at least as applied to
disputes involving the regulation of property.
In Agins, the Court held that 'the application of a general zoning law to a
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
a legitimate state interest or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land[.]' 20 0 Aginses had facially challenged City zoning regulations which limited
192 Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980). See also State ex rel. Shemo v City ofMayfield
Heights, 765 NE2d 345 (Ohio 2002); choolcraft Egg, Inc v Schoolcraft Township, 2000 WL
33409627 (Mich Ct App Aug 11, 2000); Cwynar v City & County ofSan Francisco, 109
CalRptr2d 233 (Cal Ct App 2001); Sopsich v Charter Township ofMilford, No 177033,
1996 WL 33362268 (Mich Ct App 23 July 1996); R & Y, Inc v Anchorage, 34 P3d 289
(Alaska 2001).
193 765 NE2d 345 (Ohio 2002).
194 See also Schoolcraft Egg, Inc v Schoolcraft Township, 2000 WL 33409627 (Mich Ct App 11
Aug 2000); Cwynar v City & County ofSan Francisco, 109 Cal Rptr 2d 233 (Cal Ct App
2001); Sopsich v Charter Township ofMilford, No 177033, 1996 WL 33362268 (Mich Ct
App 23 July 1996); R & Y Inc v Anchorage, 34 P3d 289 (Alaska 2001).
195 544 US 528 (2005).
196 Ibid at 544-46.
197 447 US 260 (1980).
198 Lingle, 544 US 528 at 531.
199 Ibid, at 548-49 (Kennedy J, concurring).
200 Agins, 447 US 260 at 260 (citing Penn Central Transp Co v New York City, 438 US 104,
138, n 36 (1978)).
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the type of structures permitted on their hilltop land from one to five single-
family residences. 201 While the Court held that they suffered no regulatory taking
as a result of the ordinance, 2 02 it set out the aforementioned standard for when a
regulation became a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Relatively few subsequent
cases cited the Agins decision, but when they did, it was for the 'stand-alone'
requirement that to pass muster under a Fifth Amendment regulatory takings
challenge, a government regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state
interest. 203
The 'stand alone' requirement or test was the basis for both the federal district
and circuit courts in Lingle to strike down Hawaii's rent cap statute for failure to
advance a legitimate state interest.204 Lingle has nothing to do with the use of land.
It concerned the retail price of gasoline in Hawaii, which is demonstrably higher
than the mainland at most times. The Act 257,which the Hawaii legislature enacted
in June of 1997, and which was codified at HRS § 486H-10.4, prohibits oil
companies from converting existing lessee-dealer stations to company-operated
stations and from locating new company-operated stations in close proximity to
existing dealer operated stations.2 05 It also limits the rent that an oil company may
charge a lessee-dealer to 15% of the dealer's gross profits from gasoline sales plus
15% of gross sales of products other than gasoline.206
The statute is, in layman terms, a rent cap. Chevron immediately challenged
the statute on the ground, inter alia, that it effected a facial taking of Chevron's
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution.20 7
Accepting Hawaii's justification for the statute-that it was intended to prevent
concentration of the retail gasoline market and resultant higher retail gasoline
prices by maintaining the viability of independent lessee-dealers-both the federal
district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute would
not substantially advance this interest. 208 The why's and where fore's are not pertinent
or relevant to this discussion. Suffice it to say that the US Supreme Court was now
presented with the question of whether a regulatory measure was invalid solely for
failure to advance a legitimate state interest-the first prong of the Agins test.
The Court held that it was not, that failure to advance a legitimate state interest
could never be a Fifth Amendment ground for invalidating a regulatory measure.
Finding that its Agins holding represented an 'apparent commingling of due process
and takings inquiries [which] had some precedent' 209 the Court held that 'such a
201 Ibid, at 257-258.
202 Ibid, at 262-263.
203 Lingle, 544 US at 540.
204 Ibid, at 534-535.
205 Ibid, at 533.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid, at 534-535.
209 Ibid, at 541.
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test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been 'taken'
for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.'21 0 The Court so decided on several
grounds.
First, it is doctrinally incorrect to concentrate on the 'effectiveness' of a regulation
in advancing a governmental purpose. 2 1  Noting that key to finding a Fifth
Amendment regulatory taking is the comparability to government invasion or
appropriation of private property, the Court found that the Agins test was 'tethered
neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing
regulatory actions to be challenged under the Clause,' and that therefore, '[t]he
notion that such a regulation nevertheless "takes" private property for public use
merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.' 2 12
Second, the test presents 'serious practical difficulties' by requiring a heightened
means-ends review of virtually any regulation of private property. The Court
worried about the range of regulations it would then be forced to evaluate,
potentially substituting its 'predictive judgments' for those of elected legislatures
and expert agencies. 2 13 Foreshadowing what the Court did in Kelo v City ofNew
London, the Court noted that it has long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when
addressing substantive due process challenges to government regulation.214
In sum, as the majority opinion implies and the concurring opinion by Justice
Kennedy makes explicit, the 'substantially advances' formula has no place in the
Court's Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.21 5 It is viable only as part of a
Fourteenth Amendment inquiry into the arbitrary or irrational nature of a
government regulation. However, as Chevron voluntarily dismissed its due process
claim without prejudice, the Court had no occasion to consider a Fourteenth
Amendment due process challenge to Hawaii's rent cap statute.216
4. Relevant Parcel
The question of relevant parcel is applicable both to total and partial regulatory
takings. One of the earliest formulations of the issue in a regulatory takings context
comes, again, from Penn Central: "'Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights
210 Ibid, at 542.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid, at 543.
213 Ibid, at 544.
214 Ibid, at 544-545.
215 Ibid, at 545-549.
216 Ibid, at 549.
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in the parcel as a whole - here, the city tax block designated as the landmark
'217site'.
In 1987, the Court refused to segment property vertically, holding plaintiff
coal association could not separate the mineral estate from the rest of its fee simple
interests for regulatory takings purposes in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v
DeBenedictis,2 18 cited with approval by the Court in the non-land use case of Concrete
Pipe and Products of California, Inc v Construction Laborers Pension Trust.219
The critical question, of course, is, what is that relevant parcel, or, as aptly
phrased by the Lucas opinion: 'When, for example, a regulation requires a developer
to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically
beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner
has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole ... [there follows
criticism of that portion of the New York state court decision in Penn Central
which suggested that nearby property of the owner could be combined with that
portion he claimed was unusable in deciding whether there had been a regulatory
taking] ... The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property-ie, whether and to
what degree the state's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a
diminution in (or elimination of) value'.2 20
The Court has made it abundantly clear that a 3-year moratorium is not always
a relevant interest in property for regulatory takings purposes in the recently-decided
Tahoe-Sierra case cited in the previous section, but the Court has given no clear
guidance in terms of criteria. However, several lower federal and state courts have
dealt with the issue. Thus, both Florida Rock Industries, Inc v United States,221 and
Loveladies Harbor, Inc v United States,222 discuss the denominator issue in the context
of denials of section 404 (Clean Water Act) dredge and fill permits issued by the
Army Corps of Engineers. In Loveladies, the court considered relevant only 12.5
of plaintiff's 250 acres, holding ultimately that the Corps effectively denied the
landowner all economically beneficial use and so was liable for the difference in
217 Penn Central Transp Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 130-131 (1978).
218 480 US 470 (1987).
219 Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc v Construction Laborers Penion Trust, 508 US
602 (1993).
220 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1016, n7 (1992).
221 18 F3d 1560 (Fed Cir 1994).
222 28 F3d 1171 (Fed Cir 1994).
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value with ($2.7 million) and without ($12,500) the permit. See also Palm Beach
Isles Assoc v United States, 208 F3d 1374 (Fed Cir 2000).223
Moreover, in a case the outcome of which otherwise favored the City and
County of Honolulu on virtually every issue argued-extent of owner's property
interest to bring a takings challenge, vested rights, ripeness-the federal district
court in Kaiser Development Co v Honolulu,2 24 ended its opinion by taking a very
broad view of the 'relevant parcel': 'The determination whether to treat land as a
single parcel for determining its value depends on numerous factors, such as unity
of use, contiguity, physical characteristics, historical considerations and how the
land has been treated both by the landowner and the government. [rejecting Penn
Central as distinguishable, the court continued:] Here, the primary factor supporting
the single parcel theory is that Bishop owns the property as a whole. However,
Queen's Beach is non-contiguous since it is separated from the rest of Hawaii Kai
by a road; Queen's Beach has not been developed by Bishop as part of the residential
community of Hawaii Kai; Bishop and Kaiser have always considered Queen's
Beach a separate area on which they seek to build a resort. Most importantly, the
City has treated Queen's Beach separately for zoning and planning purposes. The
City has zoned Queen's Beach for preservation uses, while most of the rest ofHawaii
Kai is zoned residential, and Queen's Beach has consistently had a different land use
designation fom the rest of Hawaii Kai. Under [applicable county plans] Queen's
Beach has been designated either commercial resort or park/preservation while the rest
of Hawaii Kai has been designated primarily for residential use. In summary, under
the facts of this case, Queen's Beach is to be considered a separate parcel for the purposes
ofdetermining whether there has been a taking.225
Some courts have reached a different conclusion with respect to the relevant
parcel, though many of these tend to be 'vertical' (usually surface/subsurface) parcel
issues rather than the horizontal, nearby parcel cases noted above. However, in a
few cases the factual context is much the same as the federal and state cases discussed
in the preceding paragraph, but with different results. One such case is Ke'rK
Construction, Inc v Department ofNatural Resources.226 There, the court considered
all of plaintiff's adjoining parcels in holding that the denial of a permit to fill
wetlands on only one of the parcels was neither a total nor a partial regulatory
taking. In so holding, the court emphasized the contiguity and common ownership
of the parcels, their identical zoning, and 'comprehensiveness' of the landowner's
development scheme which involved all of the relevant parcels. A Michigan appeals
223 See also Palm Beach Isles Assoc v United States, 208 F3d 1374 (Fed Cir 2000); East Cape
May Associates v State, 693 A 2d 114 (NJ Supr Ct App Div 1997); Animas Valley Sand and
Gravel Inc v Board of County Comm'rs, 8 P 3d 522 (colo Ct App 2000); and Woodland
Manor IIIAssociates v Reisma, 2003 WL 1224248 (RI Super Ct 24 Feb 2003).
224 649 F Supp 926 (D Haw 1986).
225 Ibid, at 947-948 (emphasis added).
226 575 NW2d 531 (Mich 1998).
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panel closely followed the reasoning in this case, holding that denial of permits to
drill water wells on fourteen contiguous but separately leased or owned (by the
same party) parcels would be treated as one parcel for regulatory takings analysis
purposes in Oaks v Montague Township.22 7
The Federal Court of Claims also discussed 'relevant parcel' extensively in
discarding some parcels and including others (both lease and fee) for mining
purposes in Appolo Fuels, Inc v US.228 There, plaintiff claimed a regulatory taking
after permits for mining certain of its parcels were denied. Critical factors were the
timing of the acquisitions in connection with the plaintiff's overall mining plan
over a five-year period. The court included some parcels acquired at different times,
depending upon the way they fit into plaintiffs' mining plans and strategy, and
omitted others on the same ground. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
there was no taking where a property owner was denied permission to build a
house on one of two lots that contained wetlands because the two lots were treated
as a single unit and the owner sold the second lot for a substantial price, so that the
land was not rendered economically valueless.2 29
In Coast Range Confers v State,230 the Oregon Supreme court held that an owner's
property had economically viable use, based on its entire 40 acres and not just the
nine-acre parcel affected by the state's bald eagle protection regulation. The Oregon
appeals court held that where logging was prohibited on 40 acres of a 200-acre
227 No 222401, 2001 WL 1512033 (Mich Ct App 27 Nov 2001). See, Banning v King County,
99 Wash App 1027 (Wash Ct App 7 Feb 2000); District Intown Properties Ltd Partnership
v District of Columbia, 198 F3d 874 (DC Cir 1999); Machipongo Land and Coal Company
Inc v Commonwealth, 799 A2d 751 (Pa 2002) (remanded to decide if there were nevertheless
some separate parcels to be used for surface mining which was now prohibited on water
pollution grounds as well as the aforementioned water-pollution-as-nuisance findings, and
also setting out a series of factors relevant in deciding which is the relative parcel, citing the
aforementioned Florida Rock Industries case: unity and contiguity of ownership, dates of
acquisition, extent to which the proposed parcel has been treated as a single unit, extent to
which the regulated lots or holdings benefit the unregulated holdings, the timing of transfers,
if any, in light of the developing regulatory environment, and the owner's investment-
backed expectations and plans for development); RWDocks & Slips v Wisconsin, 628 NW2d
781 (Wis 2001) (holding a small emergent weedbed caused by the landowner's development
would be treated as part of the rest of the land owned by plaintiff in deciding whether the
failure to grant a permit to construct the last phase of a marina was a regulatory taking);
Daddario v Cape Cod Commission, 681 NE2d 833 (Mass 1997) (holding that an entire 70
acre parcel-rather than the 35 acres for which a sand and gravel mining permit was denied
-was the relevant parcel for regulatory takings analysis in an admittedly open space-
preservation zone, because of evidence that the permitting authority would permit a less
intensive mining operation than plaintiff posed, together with the suitability of the property
as a whole for other developmental purposes).
228 54 Fed Cl 717 (Fed Cl 2002).
229 Giovanella v Conservation Comm'n ofAshland, 857 NE2d 451 (Mass 2006).
230 117 P3d 990 (Or 2005).
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parcel due to a spotted owl nesting site on adjacent land, there was no regulatory
taking under the Oregon Constitution because the 200-acre parcel, considered as
a whole, retained some economically viable use since logging was still allowed
there.231
Perhaps the most extensive recent relevant parcel discussion, however, comes
from the Federal Court of Claims in the aforementioned Cane Tennessee case decided
in June of 2003. There, recall, plaintiffs were denied certain surface mining permits
(leaving them with some timbering rights, however) on several noncontiguous
parcels. Noting that contiguity was only one factor in determining the 'relevant
parcel' for regulatory taking analysis, the court noted that other courts had held
noncontiguous parcels as one relevant parcel where the landowner 'treats legally
separate parcels as a single economic unit.' Finding that plaintiff had treated all
the tracts it purchased as one entity, treating them as a 'single investment for the
past 24 years' it was therefore disinclined to treat them separately for purposes of a
regulatory taking analysis.
5. The 'Notice' Issue
The notice issue goes to the question of whether what a landowner knew or should
have known with respect to the relevant parcel in a regulatory takings inquiry
should affect the outcome of the takings claim. With respect to a total or categorical
taking, the answer is clearly no. The Lucas opinion implies as much when it compares
such total taking with the exercise of eminent domain, in which knowledge of
regulations affecting the relevant parcel is irrelevant. The Court in the recently-
decided Palazzolo case makes this presumption explicit. 232 Although the landowner
purchased property with full knowledge of a state coastal regulatory scheme that
'greatly limited' a landowner's ability to fill and develop coastal wetlands, the Court
rejected the 'single sweeping rule: A purchaser or a successive title holder like
petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred
from claiming that it effects a taking.' The Court held that the landowner's 'claim
is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the
state-imposed restriction.' To the state's claim that such a statute constituted a
background principle of state law exception under Lucas, the Court directly
responded: 'It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background
principle of the state's law by mere virtue of the passage of title.'
This is also the position of the Federal Circuit in the Palm Beach Isles case
decided last year and discussed briefly in the preceding section on 'denominator,'
as well as the US Court of Claims in Ultimate Sportsbar v United States.233 Also a
231 Seiber v State, 149 P.3d 1243 (Or Ct App 2006).
232 Palazzolo v Rode Island, 533 US 606, 625-30 (2001).
233 48 Fed Cl 540, 547 (Fed Cl 2110) (citing Palm Beach Isles Assoc v United States, 231 F3d
1354, 1359 (Fed Cir 2000)).
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New Jersey court so held in Rohaly v State,234 in holding that a takings challenge to
the placing of wells on landowner's property survived a transfer to a new landowner.
Two recent decisions confirm this interpretation, both citing Palazzolo and holding
that successive owners may challenge land use classifications which allegedly deny
them all economically beneficial use of their relevant parcels even though they had
notice of the regulatory classifications when they purchased their properties.2 35
However, the Palazzolo opinion contains divergent views on the application of
a notice rule to partial takings. Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion is firmly
convinced that notice of an existing regulation should be part of a landowner's
investment-backed expectations to be balanced against the character of the
governmental action 236 whereas Justice Scalia, the author of the Lucas opinion, is
equally convinced it is not. 237 The cases cited immediately above can be read to
apply to both partial and total takings, but at least two state courts appear to agree
with Justice O'Connor that notice is part of the required balancing under Penn
Central in the context of partial regulatory takings challenges.238
6. Ripeness
Finally, a preliminary inquiry in any regulatory takings case is the extent to which
the dispute is 'ripe' for a final determination. The US Supreme Court in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City,239 held
that plaintiff landowner's claim for compensation based on denial of subdivision
234 732 A2d 524 (NJ Super Ct App Div 1999).
235 See, KCI Management, Inc v Board ofAppeal ofBoston, 764 NE2d 377, 380 (Mass App Ct
2002) ('We see no reason to permit challenges to the validity of a zoning enactment only
by those landowners who owned land when the zoning provisions first affected it. A rule
that a purchaser of real estate takes subject to all existing zoning provisions without any
right to challenge any of them would threaten the free transferability of real estate, ignore
the possible effect of changed circumstances, and tend to press owners to bring actions
challenging any zoning provisions of doubtful validity before selling their property.');
State ex rel Shemo v City ofMayfield Heights, 75 NE2d 345, 352 (Ohio 2002) ('Respondents
contend that there can be no taking because the challenged single-family residential zoning
existed at the time realtors acquired the property and respondents did not further restrict
the preexisting residential use of the property after realtors' acquisition of it. Respondents'
contention lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected a similar
argument[.]').
236 Palazzolo, 533 US at 631.
237 Ibid, at 636.
238 Fedus Associates LLC v Connecticut, 31 Conn L Rptr 463 (Conn Super Ct 2002); County
Line Joint Venture v City of Grand Prairie, 2001 Tex App Lexis 6000 (Tex App 31 Aug
2001). (Moreover, in Oaks, it appears that a Michigan court would continue to apply the
notice rule to both varieties of regulatory takings, though whether such an interpretation
would survive a federal challenge after Palazzolo is doubtful.)
239 Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473
US 172 (1985).
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plat approval was not 'ripe' because plaintiff had not sought a variance for his
proposed multi-lot project, nor had the Bank brought a claim in state court for
compensation. Essentially, the Court set out a two-part test which plaintiffs seeking
compensation for regulatory takings in federal courts must pass before such a court
will address the merits of a takings claim:
1. the plaintiff must have received a 'final decision' from the governmental entity
from which it is seeking land development permission, and
2. the plaintiff must seek and be denied compensation under state law.
The theory is that the Court cannot assess the extent of the loss or damage to
plaintiff's property, particularly for partial takings purposes, until the Court has
some notion of the extent of plaintiff's losses due to the challenged land use
regulation. This loss arguably depends upon the finality of local or state government's
application of its land use regulations and the compensation, if any, to which
plaintiff may be entitled from the state. After all, it is an uncompensated taking
that is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, not a taking per se. The
Court confirmed the application of this stringent barrier to federal court regulatory
taking challenges in MacDonald, Sommer 6*Frates v Yolo County,240 but noted that
'useless' and 'futile' efforts to meet the two-pronged test of ripeness were not required.
The Court then applied the 'futility' exception first in the aforementioned Lucas
case in 1992, and again in Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 24 1 in both
cases finding that it would have been futile for the plaintiff to have sought additional
relief in the form of variances or special permits once the land use approving agency
had denied the relevant request for land development permission, since neither
were available remedies at the time the respective plaintiffs brought their original
takings challenges.
Unfortunately for a landowner/developer, the burden is on the landowner to
establish the inadequacy of the state compensation remedy, and neither perceived
hostility nor lack of formal state processes (outside of court) to seek such
compensation will save landowners from having to satisfy this prong. A leading
case on this subject comes from Hawaii and was so decided by the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Austin v City & County ofHonolulu. 24 2 In an earlier case decided
in Hawaii, the court specifically held that where a developer had 'made only two
specific applications for zone change or development at Queen's Beach [and] have
made no attempt to apply for development permits, zoning changes or variances
at Queen's Beach under its present zoning' it failed to meet the first prong of the
240 477 US 340 (1986).
241 520 US 725 (1997).
'42 840 F2d 678 (9th Cir 1988).
119
DAVID L CALLIES
ripeness test set out in the Williamson case by the US Supreme Court.2 43 Worse,
after a landowner has pursued a state compensation remedy, res judicata and issue
preclusion will often prevent a Fifth Amendment takings challenge from being
maintained later in federal court under the full faith and credit provisions of 28
USC 1738.244
In San Remo Hotel, LP v City and County of San Francisco,24 5 the US Supreme
Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute for litigants
seeking to advance federal takings claims.246 While the unanimous decision is on a
fairly narrow ground, it nevertheless has implications for the resolution of an
increasingly common dilemma for litigants attacking land use regulations under
the US Constitution's taking clauses: when required to seek relief in state court
under the two-pronged ripeness requirement articulated in Williamson County
Regional Planning Com'n v Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City,2 47 the plaintiff property
owner is then usually precluded from litigating the same issues in federal court.
Rejecting the Second Circuit's recent opinion 24 8 permitting such relitigation of
federal taking claims in federal court by creating an exception to the federal
preclusion statute, the Court first reiterated that landowner plaintiffs in takings
cases have no right to pursue their federal claims in a federal forum, and second
that there was no basis for an exception to the full faith and credit statute (precluding
such relitigation) in takings cases, absent an express or implied statutory repeal.
Finding none, the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's denial of relief to the plaintiff
landowner.
However, in a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, four of the nine
justices suggest it is time to review the 1985 Williamson County ripeness requirement,
at least with respect to the second prong which requires a litigant to seek
compensation from the state before proceeding to federal court with a regulatory
taking challenge to a land use regulation. However, it is generally agreed that the
ripeness test (at least the first prong, and some say both prongs) applies to applied
challenges of land use regulations only, and not to facial challenges.
243 Kaiser Development Co v Honolulu, 649 F Supp 926, 938 (D Haw 1986).
24 Dodd v Hood River County, 59 F3d 852 (9th Cir 1995). See, for critical comment on the
insuperable barrier which Williamson County thus imposes, Thomas E Roberts, 'Ripeness
and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation', 11 J Land Use &EnvtlL 37
(1995); Michael M Berger, 'The 'Ripeness' Mess in Federal Land Use Cases, or How the
Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers', Inst On Planning, Zoning
and Eminent Domain 7-1 (1991).
24' 545 US 323 (2005).
246 28 USC § 1738.
247 473 US 172 (1985).
248 Santini v Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 F3d 118 (2d Cir 2003).
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Conclusion
Takings jurisprudence in the United States is, by and large, a well-developed body
of common law. Physical takings are measured against the backdrop of the US
Constitution's Fifth Amendment at its twin requirements of public use (now public
purpose) and just compensation. While there is not much left of the former under
federal law, states are free to impose stricter standards under our federal system,
and may have done so. The rules governing just compensation, on the other hand,
are fundamentally the same either in state or federal court, and market value is the
predominant factor considered in deciding how much compensation is due a
landowner. The concepts appear similar to those governing in Hong Kong.
The Fifth Amendment is also clearly relevant in taking by regulation
jurisprudence as well. Here, however, other (particularly common law) jurisdictions
have not always accepted the rationale for treating heavily-regulated land as
potentially 'taken' as if by compulsory purchase.24 9 Hong Kong is considering such
American jurisprudence for the first time in the past few years. The relevance of
total regulatory takings and its nuisance and background principles exceptions,
partial takings and the investment-backed expectations and relevant parcel inquiries,
all are yet to be considered. Perhaps the rich common law jurisprudence of the
United States in dealing with these issues will be helpful as Hong Kong wrestles
with their complexity in seeking its own resolution of takings issues.250
249 See, eg, Belfast Corp v OD Cars Ltd [1960] AC 490.
250 It is also apparent from recent decisions that Hong Kong is also dealing with the question
of appropriate conditions on land development (which UK courts have considered under
the rubric of 'planning gain' (see David L Callies and Malcolm Grant, 'Paying for Growth
and Planning Gain: An Anglo-American Comparison of Development Conditions, Impact
Fees and Development Agreements', 23 Urb Law 221 (1991)) which the United States
Supreme Court has exhaustively considered in Nollan v California Coastal Commission,
483 US 825 (1987), and Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994). This subject is
discussed at length in a law review symposium article by David L Callies and Glenn H
Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth: Land Development Conditions, 43
Idaho L Rev 351 (2007) and is somewhat beyond the scope of this article.
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